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Abstract
Despite the success of modern physics in formulating mathematical theories that can predict the outcome of experiments,
we have made remarkably little progress towards answering the most fundamental question of: why is there a universe at all, as
opposed to nothingness? In this paper, it is shown that this seemingly mind-boggling question has a simple logical answer if we
accept that existence in the universe is nothing more than mathematical existence relative to the axioms of our universe. This
premise is not baseless; it is shown here that there are indeed several independent strong logical arguments for why we should
believe that mathematical existence is the only kind of existence. Moreover, it is shown that, under this premise, the answers to
many other puzzling questions about our universe come almost immediately. Among these questions are: why is the universe
apparently fine-tuned to be able to support life? Why are the laws of physics so elegant? Why do we have three dimensions of
space and one of time, with approximate locality and causality at macroscopic scales? How can the universe be non-local and
non-causal at the quantum scale? How can the laws of quantum mechanics rely on true randomness?
1 Introduction
Over the course of modern history, we have seen advances in
biology, chemistry, physics and cosmology that have painted
an ever-clearer picture of how we came to exist in this uni-
verse. However, despite all these advances, it seems we have
not made any actual progress towards answering the funda-
mental question of why?
In 510 BCE, Parmenides reasoned that ex nihilo nihil fit,
or “nothing comes from nothing,” meaning that the universe in
the now implies an eternal universe without any specific mo-
ment of creation. This viewpoint was shared by later Greek
philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato, but does not really
answer the question. In 1697, Leibniz [65] asked for “a full
reason why there should be any world rather than none.” He
claimed [66] that “nothing takes place without sufficient rea-
son,” now known as the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR),
and generalized the earlier question by asking, “why is there
something, rather than nothing?”, now known as the Primor-
dial Existence Question (PEQ).
The fundamental question, further reviewed in Edwards
[31, p.296-301] and Lu¨tkehaus [68], has been echoed by many
modern philosophers such as Richard Swinburne, who said,
“It remains to me, as to so many who have thought about the
matter, a source of extreme puzzlement that there should ex-
ist anything at all” [89, p.283], and Derek Parfit, who asked,
“Why is there a Universe at all? It might have been true that
nothing ever existed; no living beings, no stars, no atoms, not
even space or time. When we think about this possibility, it
can seem astonishing that anything exists” [73, p.24].
Most physicists and cosmologists are equally perplexed.
Richard Dawkins has called it a “searching question that
rightly calls for an explanatory answer” [26, p.155], and Sam
Harris says that “any intellectually honest person will admit
that he does not know why the universe exists. Scientists, of
course, readily admit their ignorance on this point” [42, p.74].
With that said, modern inflationary cosmology does offer
some powerful new insights into this question. A generic prop-
erty of inflation is that the universe began from a small quan-
tum fluctuation [40, 41, 43, 44, 75, 87] [45, p.129][47, p.131].
According to Vilenkin [97], “A small amount of energy was
contained in that [initial] curvature, somewhat like the energy
stored in a strung bow. This ostensible violation of energy
conservation is allowed by the Heisenberg uncertainty princi-
ple for sufficiently small time intervals. The bubble then in-
flated exponentially and the universe grew by many orders of
magnitude in a tiny fraction of a second.”
According to Stephen Hawking, “When one combines the
theory of general relativity with quantum theory, the question
of what happened before the beginning of the universe is ren-
dered meaningless” [47, p.135], because, “when we add the
effects of quantum theory to the theory of relativity, in extreme
cases warpage can occur to such an extent that time behaves
like another dimension of space. In the early universe–when
the universe was small enough to be governed by both gen-
eral relativity and quantum theory–there were effectively four
dimensions of space and none of time” [47, p.134].
The notion that our timelike dimension emerged out of a
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spatial dimension is controversial. It is even more controver-
sial when Hawking argues that, “The realization that time be-
haves like space presents a new alternative. It not only removes
the age-old objection to the universe having a beginning, but
also means that the beginning of the universe was governed
by the laws of science and doesn’t need to be set in motion
by some God” [47, p.135], adding, “Because there is a law
like gravity [and quantum physics], the universe can and will
create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason
there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists,
why we exist” [47, p.180]. In other words, Hawking believes
that Leibniz’s question has been answered.
The flaw with this logic is that even if the mathematics of
spontaneous creation are correct, they are based on general rel-
ativity and quantum physics, which are not “nothing.” Thus,
it is not the ex nihilo creation of something from nothing, but
rather, the derivation of the universe in the now from a set of
axioms. This is a trivial result, because for any set of non-
contradictory statements, one can always derive those state-
ments from a set of axioms by simply taking the statements as
axioms. Hawking has presented an argument that the universe
can be derived from a reduced set of axioms, but he has done
nothing to answer the question of why those axioms (of M-
theory, or of general relativity and quantum physics) are true,
nor has he shown that they are the most fundamental possible
set of axioms. Thus, it leaves Leibniz’ question completely
untouched.
Most physicists do recognize this issue. Brian Greene
specifically pointed out that modern inflationary cosmology
cannot resolve Leibniz’s question [38, p.310], adding, “If logic
alone somehow required the universe to exist and be governed
by a unique set of laws with unique ingredients, then perhaps
we’d have a convincing story. But to date, that’s nothing but a
pipe dream” [38, p.310].
The fundamental problem that has prevented Leibniz’s
question from being answered is the blind faith assumption
that the universe really does exist in an absolute, objective
sense. When one releases this faith, and begins to consider
the possibility that there are multiple independent universes,
which do not share any common laws of physics (i.e., not sim-
ply embedded in a common framework or multiverse), then
answers come much more freely.
Under these lines, a theory that very nearly meets Greene’s
goal has been proposed by Tegmark [90], known as the Math-
ematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) or Ultimate Ensemble
theory [92, 93]. As formulated by Tegmark, the MUH rests
on the sole postulate that “all structures that exist mathemati-
cally also exist physically” [90]. Unfortunately, the meaning
of this initial postulate is difficult to grasp and apparently lacks
reasonable justification.
The primary purpose of this paper is to show that
Tegmark’s hypothesis, which would be better stated as “phys-
ical existence is the same thing as mathematical existence” is
really just an implication of the Relativity of Existence (ROE),
and that the ROE can be logically derived independently in
several different ways, such as from the postulate that human
self-awareness is governed by the laws of physics (Section
2.2), or from a logical paradox proving that “if we exist in any
sense, then that existence is relative rather than truly objective”
(Section 2.3).
2 Logical Arguments
This paper presents four independent logical arguments in sup-
port of the ROE. The first argument (Section 2.1) is a humor-
ous thought experiment that intuitively validates the ROE, but
is not a logically sound argument. The second argument (Sec-
tion 2.2) is a direct logical derivation of the ROE from the sole
assumption that self-awareness can be represented with finite
information. The third argument (Section 2.3) shows that the
concept of a single objective reality is an oxymoron, and that
if we exist, our existence must be relative. Finally, the fourth
argument (Section 2.4) shows that the ROE is the only possi-
ble theory that could ever fully answer Leibniz’s question or
resolve the fine-tuning problem.
2.1 The Simulation Thought Experiment
If self-awareness evolved in humans by emergent processes
that are subject to the laws of physics, and the laws of physics
are consistent mathematical (or statistical) rules, then there
seems to be no fundamental reason why these consistent math-
ematical rules could not be programmed into a computer in or-
der to simulate a virtual world, with equal or similar laws of
physics, in which self-aware life could also evolve.
This is an old concept, and some have even gone so far
as to suggest that our universe is really just a simulation (e.g.,
see Bostrom [13, 14], Drexler [28], Kurzweil [61], Moravec
[71], Schmidhuber [81, 82], Tipler [94]). To be clear, the idea
that our universe is really just a computer simulation is highly
controversial [69], and not supported by this author. However,
let us entertain the idea that someday in the future, the com-
putational challenges are overcome and the laws of physics
are understood well enough that a simulation containing self-
aware life could actually be created.
Suppose that, in this future, a researcher named Bob does
actually create a virtual world and observes the evolution of
self-aware life forms, which look something like a primitive
colony of humans. Through the window of his simulation, Bob
observes them being born, dying, hunting for food, falling in
love, etc. In short, they are observed to experience every emo-
tion that we attribute to humanity.
Would these simulated beings be aware of the process-
ing time that it takes Bob to simulate outcomes in the virtual
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world? The answer, as most would agree, is clearly not – the
perceptions of these virtual beings is limited to the axioms of
their world, and the processing time only affects how rapidly
Bob can simulate their world without actually affecting the in-
ternal dynamics of that world. Likewise, if Bob paused the
simulation to go out to lunch and then returned to the labora-
tory to resume the simulation, most agree that the simulated
beings would not detect any change.
What would happen if Bob’s funding was cut, causing him
to abandon his research and turn off the simulation never to be
started again? Does this affect the self-aware beings? Does
their world suddenly cease to exist? If the reader is inclined to
say that their world ceases to exist, then consider what happens
when, 10 years later, a graduate student named Eric manages
to recover the lost hard drives and restart the simulation. Be-
cause this is nothing but a long pause, we should expect the
life forms to pick up life exactly where they left off without
any awareness of the external pause.
Suppose that Eric has a mean streak and wants to play
God by programming in a mysterious hand that appears out of
nowhere, picks up the poor little virtual people, and squishes
their heads in. Has he actually affected the virtual world? On
the one hand, yes – because he can see their loved ones crying
over the loss, and he can see their philosophers tearing their
hair out over the sudden violation of the physics they thought
they understood so well. On the other hand, Bob might learn of
Eric’s mischief and decide to roll-back the simulation and pro-
ceed from the time period before Eric’s interventions, thereby
nullifying those effects.
Of course, nothing is stopping Eric from making a copy of
the simulation and continuing to observe what happens while
he plays God. Thus, the two researchers could observe par-
allel worlds unfolding before their eyes. It is not difficult to
imagine that two different parallel universes could be created
in this manner, because if one universe can be created in a sim-
ulation, then so can two. Indeed, one realizes that there are an
infinite number of universes that could be created by changing
any event at any point in time, and Eric’s intervention merely
changed which one of those infinite number of universes is be-
ing observed through the simulation.
Clearly, the simulation is necessary in order to observe
what happens in the virtual world, but does the act of running
the simulation make the world become real from the internal
perspective of those self-aware beings? Clearly, the physical
machine does not matter – the simulation could be transferred
to a different machine, or even continued on pencil and paper
(albeit slowly), or even perhaps in the mind of someone who
observed the state of the computer’s registers and was able to
mentally predict what happens next. What difference does it
make from the internal perspective of a self-aware being if the
constructs of their world are simulated or imagined from an
external world?
Under the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH), the
simulation does not need to be run in order to make a potential
universe real, because all possible worlds exist in a timeless
mathematical sense without the need for human derivation or
observation [93]. However, it would be would be wrong to
say that these realities exist in ‘parallel’ because that implies
a unifying fabric of time between them. A simulation can be
started, stopped, and restarted to observe the exact same be-
haviors, so there is clearly no shared fabric of time.
Can this thought experiment be taken as logical evidence
for the MUH? This question is investigated in further detail in
the next section, where the assumptions and conclusions of the
thought experiment are made explicit by way of a more well
defined logical argument.
2.2 The Axiomatization of Self-Awareness
By the principle of explosion, in any system that contains a sin-
gle contradiction, it becomes possible to prove the truth of any
other statement no matter how nonsensical[34, p.18]. There is
clearly a distinction between truth and falsehood in our reality,
which means that the principle of explosion does not apply to
our reality. In other words, we can be certain that our reality is
consistent.
Any system with finite information content that is consis-
tent can be formalized into an axiomatic system, for example
by using one axiom to assert the truth of each independent
piece of information. Thus, assuming that our reality has finite
information content, there must be an axiomatic system that is
isomorphic to our reality, where every true thing about reality
can be proved as a theorem from the axioms of that system.
Conscious self-aware life forms (such as humans) exist in
our reality. Thus, it must somehow be possible to derive the
existence of each such being in our reality as a theorem from
the axioms of our reality. This logic applies to all aspects of
those beings, including the actual experience of consciousness
or self-awareness.
Because an axiomatic system is defined by a unique set of
axioms, for any axiomatic system that can derive a particular
theorem, there is another axiomatic system that also derives
that theorem. This other system can be found by modifying
the original set of axioms in such a way that the theorem can
still be derived. For example, by the simple inclusion of a new
axiom that does not contradict any existing axioms, or by mod-
1As a concrete example, suppose that the popular Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is true. In this model, the laws of physics describe only
the probability of obtaining a measurement, meaning that the specific outcome of a measurement (or more specifically, the collapse of a wavefunction) requires
a unique one-shot axiom to describe that outcome in the axiomatic system of our reality. Because no particular outcome is a violation of the laws of physics,
any outcome for an individual measurement is plausible; hence, if we consider the axiomatic system formed by changing the outcome of a single quantum
measurement, it will necessarily be a different system that is in some ways contradictory to our reality, yet still capable of deriving the presence of self-aware
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ifying or subtracting an axiom that was not directly used in the
derivation of the theorem.1 Clearly, there are an infinite num-
ber of ways to modify an axiomatic system while keeping any
particular theorem intact.
Thus, there must be an infinite number of other axiomatic
systems that are in some ways different from our reality, yet
still can derive self-aware beings with self-aware thoughts. But
are these other axiomatic systems real, or merely hypothet-
ical? From an objective perspective, none of these systems
are real – they are all based on sets of axioms that contract
each other. However, from the perspective of a self-aware be-
ing within any one system, everything that is observed appears
completely consistent and real.
I have no basis for believing that my universe is real other
than the fact that I observe a consistent world around me, but
the same thoughts can be proven to be taking place in other
axiomatic systems that are contradictory to the system that de-
scribes my reality! In other words, my reality is no more real
than the others. There is no way to objectively identify any
one axiomatic system as being ’the real one.’ None of them
are (objectively) real, and at the same time, all of them are
(subjectively) real. This is the relativity of existence.
Recognizing this, the ultimate answer to the question of
why our reality exists becomes trivial: it doesn’t exist at all,
not objectively. However, somehow it is possible for self-
awareness to be represented axiomatically, and this means that
any axiomatic system that can derive self-awareness is per-
ceived as being real (internally) without the need for an ob-
jective manifestation. Thus, there is nothing special about our
reality, it is just one of an infinite number of completely dis-
joint mathematical spaces.
2.3 The Relativity of Existence
As noted by Greene, “Even if a cosmological theory were
to make headway on this [Leibniz’s] question, we could ask
why that particular theory–its assumptions, ingredients, and
equations–was relevant, thus merely pushing the question of
origin one step further back” [38, p.310]. This problem of
infinite regress has been well understood since antiquity [34,
p.38]. In fact, it is more than just a curious question, because
our natural assumptions on this subject lead to a logical con-
tradiction.
If a sentence S is objectively true, then “not S” is a contra-
diction, and a contradiction among some finite system of ax-
ioms is provably false. However, a proof that “not S” is false is
also a proof that “S is true,” which means that any objectively
true statement can be proven true with an objective proof.
Not many things can be proven objectively true, because
any proof relying on axioms is not objective without proving
that the axioms are also objectively true. A proof requires a
finite sequence of steps, so it cannot be an infinite regress.
Thus, in order to be truly objective, a proof must be free of
all axioms. However, the only things that can be proven true
without axioms are simple tautologies.
Theorem 1. The only things that are objectively true are tau-
tologies.
Clearly, our existence is not a tautology. Presumably, our
existence can be derived from the axioms of our reality (i.e.,
the general laws of physics, along with any nuance axioms to
describe initial conditions or the outcome of random events),
but these axioms are not tautologies. Thus, by Theorem 1, it
cannot be objectively true that we exist.
The only resolution to this paradox is to recognize that the
assumption that our existence is objectively true is an oxy-
moron that must be rejected. This doesn’t mean that Rene´
Descartes’ famous conclusion of cogito ergo sum, or “I think,
therefore I exist,” was wrong; rather, it means that existence
is not objective, but relative to some set of axioms, and that
relative existence does not preclude the self-aware experience.
Thus, our preconceived notion of physical existence is no dif-
ferent from mathematical existence [49] relative to the arbi-
trary set of axioms that define our reality.
Theorem 2. The self-aware experience can be derived mathe-
matically from some set of axioms. From the perspective of this
self-awareness, mathematical existence is physical existence.
2.4 The Anthropic Principle
Habitability of a planet depends on a confluence of factors
ranging from parent star class [57, 58] and stellar variation
[62], to planet mass [78], composition, orbit distance [50],
stability [64], early geochemistry conditions [74] and many
other factors [52]. If all of these properties were chosen at ran-
dom, without any overall guiding influence or purpose, then
the statistical likelihood of achieving conditions amenable to
life must be exceedingly small. Moreover, even on a theo-
retically habitable world, when we consider the likelihood of
random chemistry interactions giving rise to self-replication
and the actual evolution of life, our assessment of the overall
likelihood of any random planet harboring life becomes even
more diminutive.
Without knowing the precise details of all the chemical in-
teractions that took place in order to give rise to life on Earth,
it is difficult to make accurate predictions as to how small this
likelihood actually is. However, despite recent observations
of potentially habitable exoplanets [12] and better models of
early biochemistry indicating that life might not be quite as
rare as originally believed [59, p.47], it is only by taking into
account our cosmological observations of billions upon bil-
lions of other star systems that we can explain the presence
life.
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of life as something to be truly expected. By reasoning of the
anthropic principle that “conditions observed must allow the
observer to exist,” it is truly only necessary for at least one
of the practically infinite number of planets in the universe to
contain life in order for us to resolve the mystery of why, when
we look around, we should observe a planet with all the right
conditions for life [76].
However, the mystery is still not fully solved, because it
merely illustrates the remarkable perfection of the underlying
laws of physics that gave rise to a universe containing the ca-
pacity for life. From the molecular properties of water [48]
to the precise balance of forces such as gravity and electro-
magnetism [27], to the number of dimensions and the precise
values of all the fundamental constants, all of which exist in a
perfect balance.
As stated by Paul Davies, “There is now broad agreement
among physicists and cosmologists that the universe is in sev-
eral respects fine-tuned’ for life [25].” According to Stephen
Hawking, “The laws of science, as we know them at present,
contain many fundamental numbers, like the size of the elec-
tric charge of the electron and the ratio of the masses of the
proton and the electron...and the remarkable fact is that the
values of these numbers seem to have been very finely ad-
justed to make possible the development of life” [45, p.125].
For example, if the strength of the strong nuclear force were
changed by a mere 2%, the physics of stars would be drasti-
cally altered so much that all the universe’s hydrogen would
have been consumed during the first few minutes after the big
bang [24, p.70-71].
Can we again invoke the anthropic principle in order to an-
swer this question, once and for all? This second application
is known as the “strong” anthropic princple (SAP) [3]. How-
ever, a second application requires some evidence that there
are an extremely large number, perhaps infinite, of different
universes having different physical laws.
It is believed by some that the modern incarnation of su-
perstring theory known as M-theory [29] satisfies this condi-
tion. Under M-theory, there are 11 dimensions of spacetime,
7 of which have been curled up into some Calabi-Yau mani-
fold [19], and the fundamental constants can be derived from
the way that the dimensions have been curled up[38, p.372].
Because there are at least 10500 different ways to curl up these
dimensions [47, p.118], and the theory does not dictate which
way is correct, it is believed that all ways are equally valid and
that the selective power of the SAP explains why we exist in
a universe with fundamental constants amenable to life. The
different configurations are interpreted either as parallel uni-
verses within the multiverse [56, p.93], or as parallel histories
of the same universe [47, p.136].
The problem with these explanations based on M-theory is
that they answer the fine-tuning problem only partially. Even
if all the configurations allowed by M-theory were manifested,
this would not explain why the underlying mathematics of M-
theory were true. One could just as easily ask why the axioms
of M-theory had been miraculously selected in order to give
rise to a multiverse capable of supporting life.
Only a theory that admits all possible axiomatic systems
can fully resolve the fine-tuning problem, because only when
we stop idolizing the axioms of our universe as being objec-
tively special can we stop questioning why they are special.
This is precisely what is offered by the ROE: it tells us that
there is nothing special about our universe, because any ax-
iomatic system that can derive self-awareness will be real from
the perspective of that self-awareness.
3 Refutation of Common Objections
A number of overall objections to the MUH have already been
summarized and refuted by Tegmark [93]. Therefore, this sec-
tion will mostly focus on refuting particular objections to the
logical arguments for the ROE presented in Section 2; most
notably, Tegmark’s own misgivings about Go¨del’s theorems
(Section 3.2).
3.1 Limitations of Anthropic Reasoning
It has been claimed that “anthropic reasoning fails to distin-
guish between minimally biophilic universes, in which life
is permitted but only marginally possible, and optimally bio-
philic universes, in which life flourishes because biogenesis
occurs frequently”[25]. This point is misguided, because it
implies that we should be compelled to explain every aspect
of our universe with high likelihood. If a theory predicts all
the conditions of our universe with high likelihood, then that
is indeed encouraging, but it should not be troubling to us if
certain aspects of our universe are regarded as having a ‘low’
or less than maximal likelihood, as long as such universes are
allowed to exist under the theory.
Regardless, anthropic reasoning does indeed succeed at
selecting optimally biophilic universes. Consider the simple
case of two universes, one being a minimally biophilic uni-
verse harboring 1 self-aware life form, and the other being an
“optimally” biophilic universe harboring 1 million self-aware
life forms. In this simple example, any self-aware being se-
lected at random will have a 99.9999% chance of observing
its surroundings to be an optimally biophilic universe. This
logic continues to hold as the number of universes approaches
infinity.
Moreover, any axiomatic system defining some simple and
elegant laws that can give rise to the evolution of life as an
emergent process will almost assuredly be teeming with life,
because those emergent processes will repeat themselves over
and over. Thus, the anthropic principle will indirectly select
for universes with simple and elegant laws as well, so we
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should not be surprised that our universe has such a set of sim-
ple and elegant laws.
One realizes that it is impossible to have emergent pro-
cesses without at least an approximate notion of causality, be-
cause without causality there can be no change. It is also im-
possible to have emergent processes without at least some ap-
proximate notion of locality, because without spatial relation-
ships there could be no shape, form, structure or complexity
in the universe. Thus, the anthropic principle also selects for
axiomatic systems with spacelike and timelike dimensions, so
we should not be surprised to observe those.
Finally, we should not be surprised to find that, at the
smallest quantum scale, the universe is not perfectly local
or causal, because there is no difficulty in representing non-
localities or temporal dependencies in axiomatic systems, and
anthropic reasoning can only select for local and causal proper-
ties insofar as they permit the macroscopic capacity for emer-
gent processes.
3.2 Go¨del’s Theorems
Formally, an axiomatic system is called consistent if it cannot
prove any statement along with its negation (a contradiction),
and complete if every sentence that can be expressed in the
language can be either proved or disproved. Go¨del’s first theo-
rem shows that any axiomatic system containing a modicum of
arithmetic power is incomplete, and his second theorem shows
that any axiomatic system containing a modicum of arithmetic
power cannot prove its own consistency [36]. These theorems
have been the subject of many confusions and misunderstand-
ings, as summarized in Franze´n [34].
Currently, all theories of physics are very mathematical,
and hence both of Go¨del’s theorems apply. With regards to
the first theorem, there is a commonly expressed fear that no
theory of physics will ever be able to fully describe all aspects
of reality, because “there will always be some truths about the
real universe that cannot be proven.”
For example, in his 2003 lecture at the Cambridge-MIT In-
stitute (CMI), Stephen Hawking said, “According to the posi-
tivist philosophy of science, a physical theory is a mathemati-
cal model. So if there are mathematical results that cannot be
proved, there are physical problems that cannot be predicted,”
adding, “...some people will be very disappointed if there is
not an ultimate theory, that can be formulated as a finite num-
ber of principles. I used to belong to that camp, but I have
changed my mind” [46].
This sentiment was echoed by Freeman Dyson, who said,
“His theorem implies that pure mathematics is inexhaustible.
No matter how many problems we solve, there will always be
other problems that cannot be solved within the existing rules.
Now I claim that because of Go¨del’s theorem, physics is in-
exhaustible too” [30, p.225], and also Mark Alford, who said
“The methods allowed by formalists cannot prove all the the-
orems in a sufficiently powerful system [because of Go¨del’s
theorem]. The idea that math is ‘out there’ is incompatible
with the idea that it consists of formal systems” [51].
However, as pointed out in a response by Solomon Free-
man and later conceded by Dyson, “The basic equations of
physics, whatever they may be, cannot indeed decide every
arithmetical statement, but whether or not they are a com-
plete description of the physical world, and what completeness
might mean in such a case, is not something that the incom-
pleteness theorem tells us anything about”[34, p.88].
In other words, the first incompleteness theorem does not
imply that there will always be some truths that cannot be
proven [34, p.24]. Indeed, there is no restriction against having
an ‘incomplete’ axiomatic system where every provably true
theorem corresponds to a true statement about reality, and ev-
ery true statement about reality also corresponds to a theorem.
If the ROE is correct, then reality is defined by the things that
are provably true, and any additional undecidable statements
simply have no bearing on that reality.
Tegmark has also expressed doubts with regards to the sec-
ond theorem, lamenting that, “Our standard model of physics
includes everyday mathematical structures such as the inte-
gers (defined by the Peano axioms) and real numbers. Yet
Go¨dels second incompleteness theorem implies that we can
never be 100% sure that this everyday mathematics is consis-
tent: it leaves open the possibility that a finite length proof
exists within number theory itself demonstrating that 0 = 1.
Using this result, every other well-defined statement in the for-
mal system could in turn be proven to be true and mathematics
as we know it would collapse like a house of cards” [93, p.21].
In order to escape this issue, Tegmark proposed the more
restricted Compute Universe Hypothesis (CUH) [93] as an al-
ternative to the MUH, which only includes axiomatic systems
that are simple enough to escape these Go¨del-inspired worries.
However, Tegmark’s fears in regard to the second theorem are
also unfounded.
As explained by Franze´n [34, p.101], “The second incom-
pleteness theorem is a theorem about formal provability, show-
ing that...a consistent theory T cannot postulate its own consis-
tency, although the consistency of T can be postulated in an-
other consistent theory,” adding, “...it does not tell us whether
‘T is consistent’ can be proved in the sense of being shown to
be true by a conclusive argument, or by an argument accept-
able to mathematicians.”
In other words, this is essentially the same as the Halting
problem [85, p.173], where finding a contradiction is akin to
halting the program. If the program runs indefinitely, or if one
searches indefinitely for a contradiction without finding one,
then the halting problem or the consistency-check cannot be
completed. However, the ROE as derived in this paper does
not differentiate between those formal systems that can prove
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their own consistency or not; simply being consistent is all that
matters. Thus, the only real implication of the second incom-
pleteness theorem is that humans can never fully verify that our
consistent theories are consistent, or that our attempts to deter-
mine the exact axioms of reality are correct. This is not a new
concept, it’s the reason why scientists use the word ‘theory’
rather than ‘fact.’
3.3 Irrelevance of Leibniz’s Question
According to the logic of Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, the ROE
is the only theory that can answer Leibniz’s question. How-
ever, some philosophers, such as Bergson [10], have criticized
Leibniz’s question on the grounds that, “the question presup-
poses that reality fills a void, that underneath Being lies noth-
ingness, that de jure there should be nothing, that we must
therefore explain why there is de facto something.”
Gru¨nbaum [39, p.5] agrees, essentially arguing that the
only reason for Leibniz to ask “why is there something, rather
than nothing?” is because of the parsimonious principle that
“simple theories are objectively more likely to be true than are
complex ones” [86], which was incorrectly interpreted to mean
that the null theory, which derives nothing, should be infinitely
likely. He calls this argument the ontological Spontaneity of
Nothingness (SoN), argues that it is flawed, and that Leibniz’s
question is thereby rendered meaningless.
The SoN is indeed false, as can be recognized by consid-
ering the logical basis of parsimony. Specifically, a ‘theory’
is any logical argument that can derive some observation as a
logical consequence from a set of axioms. If all the axioms
are regarded as being independent and equally likely, then the
overall likelihood of the theory is merely the product of the
likelihood of its axioms. Thus, if simplicity is regarded as the
number of axioms, then a simpler theory is objectively more
likely.
However, because this principle only applies when the ax-
ioms can be meaningfully assigned likelihoods, one would
need to make the implicit assumption that the axioms describ-
ing the physical laws of the universe could be assigned likeli-
hoods in order to apply parsimony to a theory explaining the
origin of the universe. If this were truly the case, it would im-
ply the existence of an even more fundamental set of axioms
that describe a statistical framework from which universes are
created with random physical laws. That would mean the ini-
tially assumed axioms are actually theorems, not axioms. In
other words, the concept of ascribing likelihoods to the axioms
of reality is an oxymoron. Thus, the axioms of our reality can-
not be probabilistic, and hence one cannot say that a world
defined by a simpler (or null) set of axioms is “more likely.”
However, it is not the SoN that makes Leibniz’s question
relevant, so discrediting the SoN does not make the question
meaningless. Rather, Leibniz’s question is relevant because
as shown in Section 2.3, objective truths must be objectively
provable without axioms, yet our existence is far too complex
to be objectively proven without axioms. Under the assump-
tion that our existence is objective, this would seem to disprove
our existence. In the face of this paradox, the question of “why
do we exist?” is indeed worthy of being asked.
3.4 Infinite Information
One potential argument against the logic of Section 2.2 is that
the universe has an infinite information content, thereby pre-
venting it from being represented by an axiomatic system.
Most cosmologists believe that there is a finite amount of
energy in the observable universe, with recent analysis of 7-
year data from the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe
(WMAP) estimating that of this finite amount, 72.8%±−1.6%
is in the form of Dark Energy, 22.7%± 1.4% is in the form of
Dark Matter, and 4.56% ± 0.16% is in the form of regular
baryonic matter [9, 37, 54, 60, 63, 99].
However, this is just the observable universe, and we may
still wonder if the universe has infinite extent. According
to the Friedmann-Lemaıˆtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) model
(or Standard model of cosmology [11]), there are three possi-
ble overall ‘shapes’ of the universe described by the curvature,
Ωk, which can be deduced based on the density of matter.
If Ωk = 0 exactly then the universe is flat and infinite,
if Ωk > 0 then the universe is spherical and finite (and the
curvature also tells us the size [70]), and if Ωk < 0 then it
is hyperbolic and infinite. So far, the data has shown that the
curvature is very close to 0 [60], but this is expected, and is in-
sufficient to determine the sign [67]. Indeed, if the magnitude
of the true curvature is less than 10−4, then it might never be
possible to determine by any future experiment [96].
Regardless, it is widely believed that the total positive en-
ergy of matter is exactly canceled out by the negative energy
of gravity, thereby allowing the entire universe to be created
out of the small amount of uncertainty in the vacuum energy
of free space [45, p.129] [40, 41, 43, 44, 75] [47, p.180]. If
this is true, then the amount of positive energy is necessarily
finite.
In addition, the Bekenstein bound [6], which can be de-
rived from consistency between the laws of thermodynamics
and general relativity [4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 53], tells us
that there is a finite information content in any finite region of
space containing finite energy.
Thus, even if the universe did have infinite spatial extent
and infinite energy (contrary to modern inflationary cosmol-
ogy), there would still be a finite information content to any
particular region of the universe (such as a galaxy). This
means that at the very minimum, an arbitrarily large finite re-
gion can be represented by an axiomatic system, and assuming
that self-aware life can evolve in a finite region of space, then
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the logic of Section 2.2 would still hold in that region.
3.5 Impossibility of Quantum Simulation
It has been suggested that self-awareness (i.e., consciousness)
might rely on quantum effects [22, 23, 55, 76, 79, 98], al-
though this remains a minority opinion [21, 83], and it has
been argued that quantum decoherence disproves the quantum
mind hypothesis [84, 91]. Still, a supporter of the quantum
mind theory might potentially argue that quantum effects are
fundamentally impossible to simulate, thereby rendering the
thought experiment of Section 2.1 meaningless. That argu-
ment is investigated here, although the reader is first reminded
that Section 2.1 was only intended as a thought-primer, and is
independent from the logical arguments of Section 2.2, Sec-
tion 2.3 and Section 2.4.
As summarized by Chalmers [20], “It is natural to spec-
ulate that these [quantum] properties may play some role in
the explanation of cognitive functions, such as random choice
and the integration of information, and this hypothesis cannot
be ruled out a priori. But when it comes to the explanation
of experience, quantum processes are in the same boat as any
other. The question of why these processes should give rise to
experience is entirely unanswered.”
Indeed, given that there is now good evidence that quantum
coherence is involved in photosynthesis [72, 80], it is not dif-
ficult to imagine that quantum effects are somehow involved
in brain function. However, even if this is the case, there is
still no logical reason why the overall effects could not be ap-
proximated by some similar method in a computer simulation.
Moreover, there is no property of quantum physics that we
know of that could explain the sensation of experience any
better than classical physics.
The potential difficulty in simulating quantum systems
comes from the original Copenhagen interpretation, where the
belief is that particles do not have definite existence or proper-
ties while they are not being observed. The theory states that
inbetween periods of observation, the probability of an exper-
imenter obtaining a measurement is described by a probability
wavefunction, which collapses into a definite value upon ob-
servation. If this theory is the fullest description of reality, as is
believed by its constituents, then simulation is impossible be-
cause there simply is no mathematics or logic that can be used
to describe the interactions within a system while it is not be-
ing observed, and there is no way to observe a system without
eliminating quantum effects.
It was originally thought that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) paradox [32], Bell’s inequality [8], and Aspect’s exper-
iments [1, 2] were proof that the Copenhagen interpretation
must be correct. However, it is now widely understood that
these experiments merely prove that non-local interactions are
possible via quantum entanglement [38, p.114]. The modern
physics community is now divided between several different
interpretations of quantum mechanics [38, p.208], including
the Copenhagen interpretation, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory
[35], the Many Worlds interpretation [95], and Bohmian me-
chanics [77]. Each interpretation has slightly different math-
ematics that lead to slightly different physical predictions, so
the differences are not merely philosophical.
All of the other interpretations do permit simulation, so
until the Copenhagen interpretation is the last one standing, it
would be overly hasty to assume that quantum physics cannot
be simulated.
3.6 Quantum Randomness
Tegmark has claimed that the MUH is incompatible with true
quantum randomness because it is impossible to generate a
sequence of true random numbers using only axiomatic re-
lationships [93, p.10]. While it is true that random numbers
cannot be generated algorithmically, this does not mean that
the physics of our universe must be describable in a deter-
ministic way. In fact, even before the presence of infinitely
many worlds were predicted bottom-up by the MUH, they had
been theorized about as a top-down explanation for quantum
randomness under the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum
physics.
In order to see how this is possible, consider a simple uni-
verse containing a particle with position X parameterized by
time t, with an axiom that simply states,
||X(t)−X(t+ 1)|| ≤ τ . (1)
This constraint sets up a random walk, but there are clearly
an infinite number of different ways to choose the sequence
X(t) that comply with this constraint, all corresponding to dif-
ferent axiomatic systems. From the internal perspective of an
observer within any one axiomatic system, X(t = now) can
be measured, but X(t− 1) and X(t+ 1) can only be guessed
based on the general laws of physics that could be inferred
from past measurements. In this case, the only general axiom
that could be inferred from past measurements is the constraint
that set up the random walk. Thus, if an internal observer were
to formulate the laws of physics, they might say,
“If a particle is observed at X(t), then X(t + 1)
will be uniformly randomly distributed in the
range (X(t)− τ,X(t) + τ).”
Thus, even though the true axioms of this system had no
notion of random numbers, the best possible laws of physics
formulated by an internal observer does. This is because the
probability represents the observer’s uncertainty in being able
to predict all the “nuance” axioms that specify the precise val-
ues of X(t) for t = 0, 1, 2 . . ..
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At present, the Many Worlds interpretation does not con-
sist of a formal set of non-random axioms that can predict the
exact shape of the distributions predicted by the wave equa-
tions of quantum physics, so it is unclear whether or not such
an interpretation could be a logical explanation of the appar-
ent randomness we observe. However, the logic of this section
does prove that, fundamentally, the MUH is compatible with
universes that are internally observed to have true randomness.
This explanation would also neatly explain the Feynman sum
over histories approach without resorting to the confusing no-
tion of having infinitely many histories [38, p.180].
3.7 An Inconsistent Universe?
One of the premises of the argument in Section 2.2 was that the
universe must be consistent. Although the logic already pre-
sented for asserting the consistency of reality was sound, some
might wonder if this somehow conflicts with special relativity.
In particular, there is a principle in special relativity known
as the Relativity of Simultaneity that shows us that two ob-
servers witnessing a sequence of events from different rela-
tivistic frames will not agree on what occurred simultaneously.
Thus, one might ask whether or not the statement, “Events A
and B occur simultaneously” is true or false, and get a differ-
ent answer from each of the two observers. Does this imply
that the universe violates the principle of excluded middle, is
inconsistent, and hence not representable by an axiomatic sys-
tem?
Simply put, it does not. If special relativity were in any
way inconsistent, it could not be used to make mathematical
predictions about spacetime, and the theory would be immedi-
ately rejected based on inconsistencies with experimental data.
Although the two observers disagree on what they see, the
events can still be recorded in the fabric of spacetime in a
mathematically consistent way. The apparent paradox of the
question arises from the flawed Newtonian intuition that si-
multaneity is a fundamental aspect of the universe, rather than
an individual perception.
In other words, it is like asking, “Is this painting beauti-
ful?” This is simply a subjective opinion that depends on the
frame of reference of the observer. The ability to formulate
sentences about the universe that are not decidable does not vi-
olate the principle of excluded middle because the ambiguity
in these sentences arises from an inability to objectively trans-
late them into the language of the axiomatic system, rather
than an inconsistency of the axiomatic system itself.
If the questions were changed to, “Does John observe A
to occur simultaneously with B?” and “Does John reply affir-
matively to the question when asked if he thinks a painting is
beautiful?” then these questions could be translated into the
language of the axiomatic system, and hence they would have
definite answers.
3.8 Lack of Experimental Evidence
Tegmark’s MUH has been criticized as being untestable and
unsupported by physical evidence [33]. This is not true of the
ROE, because in Section 2.2, it was shown that the ROE can
be logically derived out of consistency with the most basic of
observations. Thus, there are simply no further experiments
necessary.
However, there is one physical prediction that might be
loosely inferred on the basis of the ROE: if the Many Worlds
interpretation of quantum physics is correct, then the most par-
simonious assumption is that these worlds would be logically
disjoint, and hence traveling between them via wormholes or
other mechanisms would be fundamentally impossible. In this
case, they could not be described as ‘parallel’ and the concept
of a ‘multiverse’ would be nonsensical without any shared log-
ical framework. This implication was already mentioned in El-
lis [33] and Stoeger et al. [88], although it should be noted that
this is not a logical requirement, because it is also possible to
have an axiomatic system that describes an entire multiverse.
3.9 Theistic Objections
It may seem at first that the ROE is incompatible with the
concept of a God. It certainly is consistent with the notion
of a godless reality, because it shows us that a reality can be
perceived from some axiomatic system without the need for
a God. However, the recognition that self-awareness can be
created axiomatically is also compelling evidence to believe
that there are some realities that do have something like a
God. This is because if self-awareness can be derived in an
axiomatic system via emergent phenomena, then there must
also be an axiomatic system that derives self-awareness more
directly without using emergent phenomena.
The fact that humans can have thoughts that are translated
into physical behaviors is proof that thoughts are part of the
axiomatic system that defines reality. According to proponents
of the Copenhagen interpretation, the role of observers is even
more direct evidence of this. Thus, there is no reason why
an axiomatic system could not be centrally defined about the
thoughts of a single self-aware entity, such that the thoughts
of that entity could influence or control the reality of that sys-
tem to any arbitrary degree necessary in order to meet all our
criteria for being a God.
4 Conclusion
We have seen that Tegmark’s controversial postulate can be
eliminated, and that the ROE can be derived either from the
assumption that self-aware entities are represented by finite in-
formation in our universe (which is an assumption that agrees
with modern theories of physics and cosmology), or merely
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from the fact that we exist (because it was shown that existence
in an objective sense leads to contradiction, and the only alter-
native is relative existence, which directly implies the ROE).
Moreover, we have seen that the ROE is the only possi-
ble theory that could ever fully answer Leibniz’s question or
resolve the fine-tuning problem via anthropic reasoning, and
that this reasoning also explains why our universe is maxi-
mally biophilic, has simple and elegant laws of nature, as well
as why it is approximately causal and local at large scales but
not at small scales. Thus, the conclusion of this paper is that
we must accept that the ROE is true, or rather, that existence
is relative.
In closing, the recognition that self-awareness is somehow
derivable from within an axiomatic system is enough to an-
swer the fundamental question of why we exist, but until we
truly understand the actual physics of self-awareness, we can-
not begin to fathom what properties are necessary for an ax-
iomatic system to derive self-awareness in order to answer the
question of how we exist.
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